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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Rate Case7 being the landmark in this field. These decisions involv-
ing railroad transportation and the liberal attitude taken in the prin-
cipal case indicate that the courts will not be exacting in their re-
quirements.8 There seems to be good cause for Mr. W. R. Mc-
Cracken's assertion 9 that ". . . the regulation of aerial navigation
will ultimately be either largely or exclusively vested in the federal
government. ..."10
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, as adopted by twenty
states, including North Carolina, 1 does not fix a definite minimum
altitude for flight, but makes it unlawful to fly so low that existing
use of the land will be interfered with. In a state court, under
this statute, the present plaintiff could probably recover.
H. L. LOBDELL.
Bailments-Proof of Loss and Presumption of Negligence-
Stipulations Against Negligence
The United States Lines issued specifications and requested bids
for the repair of the steamship America. The bids received were too
high. The specifications were changed and the defendant shipyard
received the contract on the second bidding. Und'er the first set of
specifications the contractor was required to carry insurance on the
ship for $2,000,000, owner's benefit, and premium $5,000. By the
contract agreed upon, under the second set of specifications, it was
provided, ". . . The United States Lines will continue the present
hull, machinery, and equipment insurance upon the vessel during the
period the vessel is at the contractor's yard. . . ." While in the
possession of the defendant, the ship was damaged seriously by fire.
"234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341 (1913). This case was charac-
terized by Senator Glass of Virginia as the case "which practically extirpated
every remaining right any state had over intrastate commerce." Associated
Press dispatch of Feb. 10, 1930.
8 Nor have th6 courts been exacting in determining what constitutes inter-
state commerce itself. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999 (1871)
(holding that a steamboat plying between two points in same state, but carrying
goods destined for points outside the state, was engaged in interstate commerce).
Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Smith, 250 U. S. 101, 39 Sup. Ct. 396, 63 L. ed.
869 (1919) (holding that a cook for a crew repairing a railroad bridge was
engaged in interstate commerce).
'McCracken, Air Law (1923) 57 Am. L. Ray. 97.
" Dean Bogert of Cornell looks askance upon this possibility, and declares
the principle of allowing federal interference with intrastate commerce "is one
which should be sparingly applied." Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law (1921)
6 CORN. L. Q. 271.
" p. L. 1929, c. 190, §4; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1929 Supp.) §191 (M).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In admiralty, the District Court found the defendant negligent in
handling the ship, and held that the contract did not relieve the de-
fendant of liability for loss caused by the defendant's negligence.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the
contract exempted the defendant of liability for loss caused by de-
fendant's negligence up to the agreed amount of $2,000,000.1
This case raises the following questions:
(1) Does evidence of loss or damage to goods while in posses-
sion of the bailee justify, or if unrebutted require, a finding of negli-
gence? In the absence of special contract, a bailment for mutual
benefit requires the bailee to use diligence commensurate with the
degree of skill he professes to the public to possess.2 If the bailor
proves a bailment, and the failure of the bailee to return the bailed
property, the bailee offering no evidence, the bailor makes out a
prima facie case.8 This position, under the North Carolina rule,
would permit him to go to the jury ;4 under the Federal rule, would
entitle him to recover.5 Does the bailee, by offering evidence that
the property was lost or damaged through causes consistent with due
care on his part, rebut the presumption raised by the bailor in the
above situation? The older and more prevalent rule holds that he
does, and the duty of going forward with the evidence shifts to the
bailor to prove the negligence of the bailee. 6 The Federal courts, as
in the principal case, North Carolina, and the minority of state courts,
hold that the bailor's presumption is not rebutted unless the bailee
assumes the duty of going forward with the proof of due care. 7
(2) May the bailee stipulate against liability for loss caused by
his own negligence? There is no unanimity of opinion among the
courts in answer to this question. Some courts have held definitely
'Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 34 F. (2d)
100 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
"GODDARD, OUTLINE OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (Cullen's ed. 1928) 119.
'Hanes v. Shapiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1915).
'McINTOsH, N. C. P. & P. IN CiV. CASES (1929) 609; White v. Hines, 182
N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31 (1921).
'Int. M. M. S. S. Co. v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 296 Fed. 855, 860 (C. C. A.
2d, 1924).
Note (1923) 23 Co. L. REV. 398; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pac.
Trans. Co., 120 Wash. 665, 208 Pac. 55 (1922).
'McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5
N. C. L. REv. 291; Note (1925) 3 TEx. L. REv. 290; Fleishman v. So. Ry. Co.,
76 S. C. 237, 56 S. E. 974 (1906) ; Nutt v. Davison, 54 Colo. 586, 588, 131 Pac.
390 (1913); Smith v. Economical Garage, 176 N. Y. Supp. 479, 107 N. Y.
Misc. 430 (1919); Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E. 313(1920).
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that a bailee may not contract against liability for loss caused by his
own negligence. 8 Others have adopted the view that the bailee may
contract against liability for his own negligence, provided the bailee
acts in good faith, and, unless it amounts to "gross" negligence, by
which they seem to mean misconduct approaching bad faith.9 The
Federal courts permit the private bailee to limit his liability for
negligence, but do not extend this privilege to public bailees, as it is
considered that such an extension would be contrary to public
policy.' 0
(3) The ability of the bailee in the principal case to contract
against liability for his own negligence was admitted by both opin-
ions. The main point in controversy was, "Did the bailee, by express
contract, excuse himself from such liability?" Article X, section 2,
of the contract, after stating conditions demanding the highest de-
gree of care, contained the clause, "Provided, however, that the
United States Lines will continue the present hull, machinery, and
equipment insurance during the period the vessel is at the contractor's
yard. . . ." The majority opinion construes the above provision to
relieve the bailee of liability for his own negligence, and to give the
bailee the benefit of the bailor's insurance. A private bailment for
mutual benefit does not make the bailee liable as an insurer. The
bailee, by express contract, may limit or increase his liability, but
such a variation must be clearly expressed as the intention of both
parties." The evidence showed that an express contract making the
bailee insurer was customary in similar bailments. In view of the re-
duced bid under the second specifications, this provision was not in-
cluded, except as to material removed from the ship and placed in
storage by the bailee. 12 It appears that this reveals an intention by
'Lancaster County Natl. Bank v. Smith, 62 Pa. St. 47 (1869); Pilson v.
Tip Top Auto Co., 67 Ore. 528, 136 Pac. 642 (1913).
'Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So. 671 (1902);
Grady v. Schweinler, 16 N. D. 452, 15 Ann. Cas. 161 (1907); Hanes v.
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 29.
"
0McCormick v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1903) ; Int. M. M. S. S.
Co. v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., supra note 5; The Oceanica, 170 Fed. 893 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1909). In Santa Fe, Prescott, and Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros.
Const. Co., 228 U. S. 177, 33 Sup. Ct. 474, 57 L. ed. 787 (1913), a common
carrier acting in a private capacity was permitted to stipulate against liability
for its own negligence.
'HALE, BAILM NTS (1896) 28; McCormick v. Shippy, supra note 10, at
51; Int. M. M. S. S. Co. v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., supra note 5, at 860; Marks
v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So. 671 (1902).
Newport News Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, supra note
1, at 102.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the bailor' to assume risks of loss that might occur by means other
than the negligence of the bailee. The bailee is placed by the con-
tract in the identical position as regards loss or damage due to his
negligence that he would occupy in the absence of an express con-
tract. The tenor of Article X, as a whole, does not excuse the bailee
of any liability for negligence. Consequently, the dissenting opinion
seems to reflect the sounder view.
J. A. WILLIAMS.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Fixing Liability of
Stockholders in Insolvent State Banks
The procedure by which the statutory liability of stockholders in
insolvent banking corporations could best be enforced has been a
problem in North Carolina. Prior to 1927 no assessment could be
made against such stockholders until the value of the banks' assets
in proportion to its debts had been ascertained.' This requirement
often resulted in long and expensive litigation, and made it difficult
in many cases for the receiver to enforce liability. To remedy this
situation the legislature enacted section 13, .chapter 113, Public Laws
of 1927.2
This statute first came before the North Carolina Court in Cor-
poration Commission v. Murphey.3 The defendant in the case was a
stockholder inwan insolvent bank, and had failed to pay the "levy"
docketed in clerk's office of the Superior Court by the Corporation
'Corporation Commission v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 193 N. C. 113,
136 S. E. 362 (1927) ; Corporation Commission v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
192 N. C. 366, 135 S. E. 48 (1926) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §239.
'"After the expiration of thirty days from the date of the filing of the
notice of the taking of possession of any bank, in the office of the clerk of the
Superior Court, the Corporation Commission may levy an assessment equal
to the stock liability of each stockholder in the bank, and shall file a copy of
such levy in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court, which shall be re-
corded and indexed as judgments, and shall have the force and effect of a
judgment of the Superior Courts of this state; and the same shall become due
and payable immediately, and if not paid execution may at the instance of the
Corporation Commission issue against the stockholder delinquent, and actions
on said assessments may be instituted against any non-resident stockholders
in the same manner as other actions against non-residents of the state. Any
stockholder may appeal to the Superior Court from the levy of assessment;
the issue raised by the appeal may be determined as other actions in the
Superior Court. At any time before the determination of said appeal such stock-
holder may petition the resident or presiding judge to relieve his property of
the lien, pending the determination of the question raised by said appeal; and
such relief may be granted in the discretion of the judge hearing the petition
and upon such terms as he may fix." N. C. Code (Michie 1927) §218c (13).
' 197 N. C. 42, 147 S. E. 667 (1929) ; affirmed 50 Sup. Ct. 161 (1930).
